This study estimates the effect of fluctuations in local labor conditions on the likelihood that existing participants are able to transition out of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Our primary data are SNAP administrative records from New York (2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012) linked to the 2010 Census at the person-level. We further augment these data by linking to industry-specific labor market indicators at the county-level. We find that local labor markets matter for the length of time individuals spend on SNAP, but there is substantial heterogeneity in estimated effects across local industries. While employment growth in industries with small shares of SNAP participants has no impact on SNAP exits, growth in local industries with high shares of SNAP participants, especially food service and retail, significantly increases the likelihood that recipients exit the program. We also observe corresponding increases in entries when these industries experience localized contractions. Notably, estimated industry effects vary across race groups and parental status, with Black Alone non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and mothers benefiting the least from improvements in local labor market conditions. Our models include county fixed effects and timetrends, and our results are identified by detrended within-county variation in local labor market conditions. We confirm that our results are not driven by endogenous inter-county mobility, New York City labor markets, or cohort composition effects associated with the Great Recession.
Introduction
The link between labor market conditions and participation in USDA's Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) has long been of interest to policy makers and program administrators. Historically, SNAP caseloads have risen and fallen with the * USDA Economic Research Service † U.S. Census Bureau ‡ Disclaimer: This paper is released to inform interested parties of research and to encourage discussion. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the USDA or the Census Bureau. level labor market indicators to obtain more accurate estimates of the effect of local labor market conditions on participants' decisions to transition off the program. Building on similar research by and , who used administrative program records to examine effects of local labor market conditions on cash welfare receipt first study that, to the best of our knowledge, uses SNAP administrative records to analyze the relationship between local labor market conditions and SNAP participants' spell duration. Second, it evaluates the importance of employing more granular measures of labor market conditions when analyzing the impact of the economy on SNAP enrollment.
Lastly, by using recent microdata on SNAP receipt from New York-a large and diverse state-this study provides improved, and more recent, estimates of SNAP recipients' behavioral responses to local labor market conditions. This last contribution is similar in nature to and , who used administrative records to examine the AFDC/TANF programs in California and Maryland. Our study extends this previous work by accounting for utilization of other safety-net programs such as TANF and several state public assistance programs while estimating the labor market effect of participation in SNAP, an important step when considering program participation dynamics in the context of multiple program enrollment. Our study also differentiates itself by showing how antipoverty program participants respond to economic opportunity when programs offer in-kind benefits rather than direct cash transfers (as in AFDC/TANF). This is particularly relevant in light of large role in the U.S. saftey-net of programs offering in-kind benefit transfers, such as SNAP, Housing Assistance, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the literature on factors influencing individuals' entry into and exit from SNAP. Section 3 describes the data and sample construction, Section 4 details our estimation strategy, and Section 5 presents our results and sensitivity analysis. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
Prior Research on SNAP Dynamics
A number of studies have investigated the dynamics of SNAP participation using household microdata. The USDA Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) has commissioned an ongoing series of reports, produced by Mathematica Policy Research (MPR), that uses the most recent panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to analyze the determinants of program entry and exit Mabli et al., 2011b,a) . These reports have focused on State policy variables and householdlevel trigger events and have consistently identified adverse income shocks as the most common trigger for program entry. Along the same lines, used SIPP data from 2001 to 2003 to focus on the relationship between SNAP dynamics and changes in employment status. Their results suggest that employment changes are more strongly associated with entry to (and exit from) SNAP for individuals with more stable employment histories.
These reports employ longitudinal data that follow respondents for a period of about 2-3 years. But this rather brief window of observation gives rise to two shortcomings. One is that many of the program spells observed in the data are left-censored and therefore the beginning of the spell, as well as other events contemporaneous with the start of the spell, cannot be identified. Omitting left-censored spells, which tend to be longer than average, results in a biased sample. 4 pursue a somewhat different approach to the study of SNAP receipt dynamics. Rather than estimating a duration model, they employ lagged-dependent variable models, which control for individual unobserved heterogeneity and estimate one-period state dependence in SNAP. Their sample is drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) which allows them to examine SNAP dynamics over a longer time frame than the studies using the SIPP. They found that welfare reform measures also had the effect of reducing long-term dependence (i.e., referred to as state dependence) in SNAP participation. Moreover, SNAP policies that discourage program entry, either through changes in benefit levels or certification requirements, also have the effect of reducing state dependence in SNAP participation. , , and each study dynamics using administrative records from a single state. , however, is the only one of these studies to model unobserved heterogeneity. Using the NLSY79, examines the role of SNAP in transitions off cash welfare and into employment. He finds some evidence that SNAP may discourage employment and transitions off welfare. Although with , this is one of the few studies to explicitly account for individual unobserved heterogeneity. In this case, discrete mass points are used to approximate the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. However, this study does not directly model SNAP dynamics, but rather is interested in the dynamics of TANF and work (e.g., on welfare without work, off welfare with work, etc.).
Another strand of evidence on SNAP and labor market comes from studies using household survey data . These data sources also suffer from a number of shortcomings.
Although household surveys provide rich information on individuals, they typically do not disclose sub-state geographic identifiers, so that labor markets smaller than the state cannot be identified. Moreover, sample sizes in the household panel data are generally too small to support analysis of labor market conditions at a level lower than the state.
A final concern with survey data is the well-documented measurement error in SNAP participation itself . SNAP participation is measured with substantial error in the cross-section, and survey measures of participation spells appear to suffer from even greater mismeasurement David, 2005, 2010) .
Data and Descriptive Statistics

Data Sources
We use administrative records from New York State linked to a number of other data sources that provide information on person and county characteristics. The use of administrative micordata address a number of shortcomings associated with other data sources.
For example, many studies utilize administrative caseload data aggregated monthly in order to study patterns of program participation. However, aggregate caseload data for a given month combine existing spells and new entries, so researchers cannot seperately identify the effects of spell length from changes in entry rates. Individual microdata, on the other hand, allow researchers to identify the effect of spell length conditional on entry . 5 Second, microdata permit anlysis by demographic subgroup, which is not possible using aggregated data.
The administrative microdata also confer several benefits over microdata from household surveys. One of the chief benefits is that SNAP administrative records allow us to overcome the misreporting of program receipt pervasive in household survey data Meyer et al. (2009); . The administrative records also provide rich information on how individuals are grouped to form SNAP cases. This is important because the survey concept of a household often differs from the SNAP case unit, and a given survey household can contain multiple case units. The administrative data allow us to precisely measure characteristics of the case unit, such as unit size, the number of elderly and non-elderly individuals, presence of children, and monthly benefit transfer amounts. Finally, our data feature a long observation period (six years) relative to the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which is commonly used to analyze dynamic aspects of SNAP participation. This long panel enables us to better observe spells in their entirety, obviating to a greater degree the difficulties that can arise from left-censored observations, but it also allows us to better identify individuals with multiple spells. Accounting for multiple spells may be important given over 30 percent of recipients in our six-year observation period experienced two or more SNAP spells. 6
Another benefit of the administrative records is that they contain very granular geographic identifiers, down to the Census block and tract level. In this study, we demarcate the local labor market as the recipient's county of residence and use county-level identifiers to merge to two other sources of data: the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) and the Census Bureau Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). From the LAUS data we obtain monthly county-level unemployment rates. From the QCEW, we obtain county-level monthly employment counts, overall and by industry. The QCEW also provide quarterly wage data. In this study, we use the average weekly wage in a quarter, both across all industries within a county and disaggregated by industry. These data sources allow us to address potential measurement error that stems from defining the labor market too broadly and thereby masking potentially important heterogeneity in labor market conditions across counties within a state and across industries within a county .
An important consideration for this study is how to delineate local labor markets. To be sure, counties do not always correspond to local economies: local labor markets can encompass several counties or, in some cases, a county can contain more than one local labor market. Other measures, such as commuting zones (CZs) and Labor Market Areas (LMAs), have been developed in an attempt to better capture economically integrated geographic areas, generally defined as areas in which individuals can reside and find employment within a reasonable distance. In this study, however, we eschew these alternative measures, and define local labor markets as coterminous with counties. While counties may not perfectly capture local labor markets, we believe they remain reasonable, 5 The caseload, measured at a given point in time, is a stock sample, and therefore subject to length-biased sampling. The administrative microdata, on the other hand, is a flow sample. 6 We smooth over one month gaps in enrollment to avoid treating temporary lapses in certification as actual spell breaks. and convenient, approximations to local labor markets. These alternative measures are also not without drawbacks. Commuting zones, developed by USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), have been not been updated since the release of measures based on the 2000 Census, and are currently undergoing a revision of the underlying methodology.
LMAs, also developed by USDA ERS, were last constructed from the 1990 decennial census and have since been discontinued. BLS defines its own Labor Market Areas, based primarily on metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas (which in turn are based on Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs)), as well as small LMAs which typically consist of one or more counties. Previous work on local labor markets has relied primarily on the county-based definitions . How different definitions of local labor markets affect the analysis presented here is a topic of future work.
The administrative records are a longitudinal file, composed of person-month records.
We identify individuals over time on the longitudinal identifier known as the Protected
Identification Key (PIK), which is a unique identifier used within the Census Bureau's Center for Administrative Records Research and Applications (CARRA) to link individual person records across data sets. PIKs are assigned through the Person Identification Validation System (PVS), which employs probability record linkage techniques (see Wagner and Layne (2014) for more information). CARRA uses Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as name, date of birth, and address to assign a PIK, and then removes the PII from the data file to anonymize the data and preserve confidentiality so it can be used for statistical purposes and research.
Identifying individuals via PIKs also permits us to augment limited demographic information in the administrative records. We use the PIK to link individuals to their responses about race and Hispanic origin in the 2010 Census. These demographic characteristics allow us to control not only for overall differences in the likelihood of exiting SNAP across groups, but also for differential responses across groups to changes in local labor market conditions. A discussion of the data linkage, including match rates and limitations of this approach, follows in Section 3.3.
Sample Construction
The universe of SNAP participants in New York from 2007 to 2012 includes records for 185.2 million person-months, representing just under 8.6 million individuals and 11.1 million participation spells. 7 In general, the rate of PIK-assignment in the administrative data is very high. Of the 185.2 million person-months, 99.2 percent of the records were assigned a PIK. Of the nearly 8.6 million person records, 96.8 percent were assigned a PIK.
To construct our analysis sample, we drop all individuals without a valid PIK. Next, in order to focus on the working-age population, we exclude children under 18 and individuals over 64 years of age. 8 Finally, we drop one-month spells. 7 As is typically done with survey data, we smooth over one month gaps in spells, as these are likely the result of administrative churning that reflects neither a true interruption in the spell or a change in the participant's economic circumstances.
8 Furthermore, members of these age groups are less likely to play a role in the decision to participate in the program. According to SNAP rules, children under 18 years of age cannot form their own SNAP unit if there is another "responsible" adult in the household. And as with children, some elderly individuals will Even with these restrictions imposed on the universe of SNAP administrative records, our full analysis sample is still quite large. In the six years of our analysis period, we observe nearly 84.5 million person-months, with 4.2 million entries and 3.6 million exits.
We observe over 3.9 million unique individuals with over 5 million participation spells.
These data are used in the first part of Section 3.3 to provide a complete picture of caseloads, entries, and exits.
The resulting administrative data are linked to the set of individuals assigned a PIK in the 2010 Census for New York state. Although the PIK rate for the New York component of the Census is not as high as that of the administrative records, it is still quite strong at 90.8 percent. 9 However, it is important to be aware that PIK assignment, particularly in the case of the Census data, is non-random. In particular, young children, minorities, residents of group quarters, immigrants, recent movers, low-income individuals, and non-employed individuals are less likely to receive a PIK . The result of the data linkage was that 74.2 percent of the person-months and 71.6 percent of the persons in the SNAP administrative data were matched to their records in the 2010 Census.
The final step in constructing our analysis sample is to take a two percent random flow sample of our data for our model estimation. We do this because estimation of non-linear hazard models over the full matched data set is computationally intensive, particularly when including county fixed effects. This is a relatively common approach. , for example, works with a 1 percent sample of California's Medicaid data.
Using this two percent sample, we note some differences between the individuals in the administrative data who did and did not match to their 2010 Census records.
In general, those individuals whose records were not found in the Census are more likely to be males who live in smaller households with fewer children and fewer elderly members. They are also more likely to live in metropolitan areas and more likely to have moved during the observation period. There do not appear to be meaningful differences, however, in age, participation in other programs like TANF and state public assistance, or the year in which someone first appear in the data. Appendix Table A1 provides a detailed analysis of the differences between the matched and non-matched samples. While these differences are mostly statistically significant, many of them are practically small. Furthermore, estimating our main models over the entire sample, but without controlling for the demographic characteristics included in the matched sample, yields findings that are similar to our main results.
Descriptive Statistics
We begin by discussing censoring, individual spell counts, and spell lengths using the full set of administrative records, subject to the restrictions described in the preceding section.
We are able to observe roughly 60 percent of the spells in their entirety. Left-censored spells-i.e., spells in progress as of January 2007-account for about 16.5 percent of all also be more likely to be a dependent in a SNAP unit and thus may not be making the participation decision on their own. 9 The relatively high match rate in the administrative files is due to the requirement that individuals provide valid Social Security Numbers in order to qualify for SNAP benefits. The decennial census, on the other hand, does not collect respondents' SSNs. spells. Of these, 22.8 percent are also right-censored. A further 25 percent of spells are right-censored only, so that right-censored spells account in total for nearly 28.7 percent of spells. 10 The high incidence of right-censored spells is a product of the large number of spells that started during the recession and recovery but did not end as of December 2012.
Fortunately, right-censoring does not pose a problem for the hazard models we estimate below.
The majority of individuals in our data-75.1 percent-have only one spell between 2007 and 2012. Nearly 25 percent of the recipients during this period, however, have multiple spells of SNAP receipt. Specifically, 18.5 percent have two spells, 4.8 percent have 3 spells, and nearly 2 percent have 4 or more spells. Among all spells, the mean spell length is 16.9 months. Restricting attention to only complete (i.e.,non-censored spells), the mean spell length is nearly 11 months. As expected, excluding censored spells biases the mean spell lengths downward. Given the degree of right-censoring, however, this bias is perhaps not as large as one might have expected. The longest possible time participating in our data is 72 months. The mean total number of months participating, however, is 21.6 months. it is notable that the caseload changes were driven by substantial changes in both entry and exit rates, although entry rates appeared to adjust more quickly to their pre-recession level. This occured despite a very modest decline in the state unemployment rate.
What is also striking about this figure are the pronounced spikes in the entry rate in January of each year. This is likely the result of a program in New York State under which Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients who live alone are automatically enrolled in SNAP under the New York State Nutrition Improvement Project (NYSNIP) at the beginning of the calendar year. These new case openings will be closed if the benefits are not used in given amount of time, thus many of these case openings are in fact spurious spells. More work will need to be done to try to identify these NYSNIP-related spells. interesting co-movement between the unadjusted unemployment rate and the SNAP caseload. We observe the rate of growth in the SNAP caseload leveling off starting in 2011, but the overall caseload continued to grow, which may indicate that the January "spikes" observed in Figure 1 may not entirely reflect spurious spells. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the two percent estimation sample linked to the 2010 Census. The unit of analysis is the individual in the first month we observe that person in the administrative records. More than half of the sample is female (56 percent), and the average age is nearly 37 years old. About 40 percent of the sample reported their race as non-Hispanic White alone in the 2010 Census, 25 percent reported non-Hispanic Black or African American alone, and 28 percent reported Hispanic. This distribution differs from the overall population of 18 to 64 year olds in New York state who were assigned a PIK. Among those, 63 percent report their race as non-Hispanic White alone, 13 percent as non-Hispanic Black or African American alone, and 15 percent as Hispanic. 12
Thus, the SNAP participants in our data are less likely than the general population of 18 to 64 year olds to report non-Hispanic White alone, and more likely to report non-Hispanic 11 Note that, due to our prior cuts to the data, these numbers represent the number of adults on the programs, also excluding those over age 64. 12 Authors' calculations from internal 2010 Census files.
Black alone or Hispanic. The average case unit size is 2.5 members, with 25 percent of cases having a child four years old or younger and another 22 percent having child between the ages of five and 17. About 4 percent of case units have a member who is elderly. The average log monthly benefit amount for a case was 5.55, or $257.24, 2 percent of cases were on TANF at some point in the observation period, and 6 percent were on another form of state-run public assistance. Most participants in our data (76 percent) lived in metropolitan areas, and only 7 percent of the sample relocated from one county in New York State to another during the sample period.
Methodology
Our main methodological approach is to estimate hazard models to examine the determinants of exit from SNAP. Specifically, we estimate discrete-time hazard models of program exit using the complementary log-log link function. Individuals are considered to be at risk of exiting SNAP as soon as they are first observed to enter the program. Thus for individual i the probability of exiting a SNAP spell at time t in county c is given by:
where F(·) denotes the complementary log-log link function. This functional form approximates in discrete-time the proportional hazard model in continuous time. The vector x ict contains the explanatory variables of the model and γ it represents duration dependence, or the effect on the SNAP exit probability of time at risk. We choose a relatively flexible functional form for the baseline hazard: modeling it as a cubic function of time spent on SNAP. 13 The discrete-time hazard model estimates the probability of an individual exiting SNAP in a given month conditional on that individual not having left the program prior to that month.
The log likelihood function takes the following form:
wheret is the longest observed duration, N is the number of individuals in the sample, and y it is equal to one if individual i is observed to exit SNAP in period t and is equal to zero otherwise. With the data arranged in person-period format, individuals who do not exit SNAP during the sample period will have a y it sequence equal to zero for every period, t. Individuals observed to exit SNAP during the period will have a y it sequence equal to zero for every period except for the period in which they exit SNAP, their last period in the sample.
Following Hoynes (2000), our preferred specification includes county fixed effects and county time trends, so that x ict 's in equation 1 becomes:
The variables of interest are those in the vector Labor ct , which reflect alternative measures of time-varying, county-level, and industry-specific labor market conditions, conditional on log county labor force. We ensure that φ is identified by non-linearly Appendix Table A4 , we present results from base models that relax our identification assumptions; namely, we estimate models that do not include the county fixed effects or time trends as well as models that include county fixed effects but not time trends.
Standard errors are clustered at the person-level. 15
Our preferred specification estimates the effect of county-and industry-specific fluctuations in employment on exit hazard while controlling for monthly county-wide average wage levels. 16 In all our models, we focus on industries that are likely to be important for Our parameters of interest, φ, are identified by within-county and across-industry variation in employment that differences out county-specific trends in the labor market. industry-level labor market conditions. We plot QCEW employment levels for each of the four industries relevant to SNAP participants as well as three additional industries that employed small shares of SNAP participants: Information Services, Finance, and
Utilities. We show plots for total employment over all of New York state in the top-left panel of Figure 3 and for three counties that exemplify the types of variation across the capital to labor-but the Retail, Food, and Construction industries each display strong seasonal patterns in employment. However, while Retail typically peaks in the fourth quarter, Construction and Food Services typically peak in the third quarter. And although Construction employment has a gradual increase and decline with a rounder peak, Food
Services employment tends to feature rapid changes and sharp peaks. It is worth noting that there is also substantial within-industry variation in employment trends across counties for each of the four SNAP-intensive industries. On the other hand, the industries that employ smaller shares of SNAP participants-Finance, Information Services, and
Utilities-all display remarkably stable employment levels, underscoring the economic volatility faced by many of the people who qualify for SNAP benefits throughout the year.
The vector Z includes covariates for recipient age, age squared, gender, race and Hispanic origin, several variables characterizing SNAP unit composition (presence of children under 5, presence of children 5-17, presence of elderly members, presence of non-elderly members, and presence of non-elderly adults), an indicator for monthly inter-county mobility, and an indicator for ever changing county of residence during our observation period. In all models we control for the natural log of the monthly SNAP benefit amount, and receipt of TANF and state general assistance benefits by members of the unit. 19 To capture other time-varying environmental factors that may affect the SNAP exit probability, we also include year indicators, and we model the baseline hazard, γ it , as the number of months on SNAP, plus its square and its cube. Finally, we control for the natural log of the county's population size and the urban-rural status of the county.
Without adequate pre-sample information on recipients, we are not able to address left-censoring by modeling initial conditions . We therefore follow much of the literature and eliminate left-censored spells from the main analysis sample and analyze them separately. In doing so, we are likely disproportionately eliminating longer than average spells. And as previously noted, we also eliminate one-month spells.
A substantial proportion of our sample (about 25 percent) had more than one spell of SNAP participation during the period of observation. We follow much of the literature on hazard modeling and restrict our estimation sample to first spells of participation . We do, however, extend our analysis by estimating our main model over second spells and find that the relationship between local labor market conditions and hazard of program exit for those in their second spell is very similar to those in their first spell. Future work will seek to incorporate higher order spells of participation into the analysis, including models that allow for individual unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated across across spells for a given recipient. 20 19 Note that our administrative records do not contain information on income. However, conditional on case unit size, benefit amount is largely a function of the unit's income (in some cases it is also a function of medical expenses, shelter costs and other deductions), so controlling for benefit amount provides a proxy for case unit income. 20 Attempts to estimate single spell models that incorporated unobserved individual heterogeneity as a discrete mass point distribution (with two mass points) had difficulty converging. As noted in the text, it is often argued that flexibly controlling for the baseline hazard function ameliorates much of the bias that can arise from ignoring individual unobserved heterogeneity in discrete-time duration models. And in a similar study using AFDC/TANF administrative records from California, reports that specifications that accounted for individual unobserved heterogeneity did not appreciably alter her results.
Results
Figure 4 SNAP Exit Model: Unconditional Hazard
In figure 4 , we plot the unconditional hazard of SNAP exit. Two features should be noted in this figure. One is that the hazard of exit is decreasing with spell duration, suggesting negative duration dependence. Negative duration dependence implies that the longer someone is on SNAP, the less likely they are to exit. It is important to note, however, that we are not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. And given the sparse individual-level characteristics in our model, neglecting this unobserved heterogeneity may well be important, despite not imposing any assumptions on the form of the duration dependence. By ignoring unobserved heterogeneity we may confounding the hazards of two (or more) very heterogeneous groups of SNAP participants: one group we might term "fast exiters," and another, "slow exiters". That is, we might have one group that is on SNAP for a short spell in the face of some negative shock. They contribute to the high exit rates we observed for early durations. At longer durations, however, as more of these "fast exiters" leave the program, only slow exiters will remain in the at-risk pool. Disability may be one source of unobserved heterogeneity that could lead to such a scenario. In the results that follow, we control for several person and case-level characteristics to attain estimates of conditional discrete time hazard models. The sample includes first (i.e., non-left-censored) spells only. We look first at the effect of overall county employment in column 1. Estimates from a fully-saturated model appear in column 2. Columns 3-6 focus in turn on employment in construction, the food industry, manufacturing, and retail. All regressions include the demographic controls (age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin) and case-composition controls listed in Section 4, year effects, duration controls (spell duration, its square, and its cube), county characteristics, county fixed effects, and county time trends. In addition, we include an indicator for changing county of residence during the observation month to reduce potential bias that may arise from individuals endogenously moving to areas with more favorable labor conditions. We also include an an indicator for ever changing county of residence during the entire observation period in order to account for for potential differences in unobserved characteristics of those who relocate relative to those who do not. We present estimates of our parameters of interest, φ, in Table 2 ; full regression results are provided in the appendix. in column 1 indicate that, at the mean, a one percent increase in a county's overall employment level is associated with a roughly fourfold increase in the likelihood of exiting SNAP. Columns 2-6, however, show that employment growth in a given county has substantially heterogeneous estimated effects across industries. The full model in column 2 simultaneously estimates four industry-specific effects. All the coefficients are, as expected, positive, but only the coefficients on construction and retail employment are statistically different from zero (recall that when interpreting hazard ratios, as we are here, the null effect is at unity rather than at zero). Employment in the manufacturing sector has essentially a null effect; a one percent increase in construction sector employment raises the probability of program exit seven percent, an effect that is marginally statistically significant. The coefficient on employment in the food service industry is moderately sized (1.29), but not precisely measured. Retail sector employment has the largest effect, with a hazard ratio of 2.82, and is significant at the one percent level.
Main Results
Multicollinearity may be a concern when all four industry measures are included in the model. We therefore estimate alternative specifications in which employment in each industry enters the model separately in columns 3-6 of Table 2 . Column 3 shows point estimates on employment in the construction industry that are very similar to thos shown in column 2. The most notable result in columns 3-6 is the increase in the magnitude and significance of the coefficients on employment in food services and retail. For example, column 4 indicates that a 1 percent increase at the mean in food services employment is associated with a 52 percent increase in the hazard of exiting SNAP. As in the full model, the most pronounced effect is for retail employment. Column 6 suggests a one percent increase at the mean in retail employment in a person's local labor market more than triples the hazard of exiting SNAP.
In order to visualize these results, Figure 5 uses the estimates from Table 2, columns 3-6, to simulate how a given increase in industry employment would change the mean probability of SNAP exit. Specifically, we simulated, for each of the four industries, a one standard deviation increase in industry employment from the mean. The horizontal axis captures the number of months of SNAP participation (i.e., spell length), while the vertical axis measures the cumulative probability of exit in each month of the spell (i.e., the cumulative hazard function). The vertical red line in each graph denotes the overall mean spell length in New York. The most striking feature of this figure is the rapid and wide divergence between the cumulative hazard functions in the retail sector. By the mean spell length of seven months, a one standard deviation increase from mean retail employment raises the exit hazard from eight to 25 percent. For construction and manufacturing, the divergence is negligible. In the food service sector, a one standard deviation increase in employment raises the cumulative hazard two percentage points, from three to five percent, by month seven of a SNAP spell. 
Retail
As a whole, Table 2 and Figure 5 suggest that even in the presence of controls for county fixed effects and time trends, local labor market conditions-proxied by employment levels-are positively related to the likelihood that SNAP participants exit the program.
SNAP exits were very responsive to changes in total county employment (controlling for the county population and county labor force), however looking only at total county employment masks substantial heterogeneity in estimated effects across industries. Among the industries considered in this study, SNAP exits appear to be most sensitive to changes in the strength of the retail sector, although the food service sector also shows strong (albeit somewhat imprecise) employment effects. Finally, we see some evidence that fluctuations in construction employment levels are modestly but precisely associated with exiting the program. In the follow section, we extend the results in Table 2 and also conduct several robustness checks.
Robustness checks
In Table 3 , we estimate several alternative specifications of our basic hazard model in order to test the robustness of the results in Table 2 . These robustness checks include accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity, endogenous mobility, composition effects based on New York City residence, composition effects based on differences in cohort characteristics due to the Great Recession, potential endogeneity of labor market measures, and higher order spells. We also include a "placebo test" to verify that employment growth in industries with small shares of SNAP participants has no discernable effect on SNAP exit. Table 3 comes from a different regression where industry employment variables appear one at a time, as in Table 2 . Column (1) adds Gaussian random effects to the models in Table 2 . Column (2) drops any indiviudals who changed counties during the observation period. Column (3) drops all residents of New York City. Column (4) adds an indicator for appearing in the data after the start of the Great Recession and interacts that indicator with each of the log employment variables (only the main effects are shown). Column (5) adds one-period lags of industry employment measures (only the contemporaneous measures are shown). Column (6) estimates exit hazard using individuals in their second spells rather than their first spells. Column (7) shows results for industries with small shares of SNAP participants. Exponentiated coefficients are shown. Standard errors are clustered at the person-level and in parentheses. * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
Each coefficient in
Unobserved Individual Heterogeneity
A shortcoming of the basic discrete-time hazard model represented in equation 3 is that it does not account for unobserved individual heterogeneity .
Unlike in linear models, ignoring individual heterogeneity in a (non-linear) hazard model
can lead to biased estimates, even if the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the independent variables in the model . Moreover,the potential bias introduced by ignoring unobserved heterogeneity is not limited to estimates of the duration dependence parameter. Monte Carlo evidence shows it can also substantially affect estimates of the other explanatory variables in the model . 21 Despite these pitfalls, few studies of SNAP dynamics have considered the implications of different assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity. We incorporate unobserved individual heterogeneity into the basic model by introducing a random term, η:
We assume η follows a Gaussian, or normal, distribution. 22 Underlying this approach
is the strong assumption that the the unobserved individual heterogeneity is not correlated with any of the other covariates in x ict .
The results from this model appear in column 1 of Table 3 . Although the estimated coefficients on food services and retail-the industries with the largest estimated effects in the base model-become even larger (and more precise) when Gaussian unobserved individual heterogeneity is introduced, the results are quite similar to those appearing in Table 2 .
Endogenous mobility
As shown in Table 1 , 7 percent of our sample relocated to a different county during the observation period, and all of the models up to this point include an indicator for changing county of residence in that month as well as an indicator for ever changing county of residence during our observation period. Nevertheless, one may still be concerned that SNAP recipients' relocation decisions are related to other unobservable characteristics that affect their labor market outcomes. This may occur, for instance, if more motivated or relatively high-skilled recipients are more apt to relocate to counties with favorable labor market conditions. 23 Alternatively, SNAP recipients who are not as employable may be more inclined to move to counties with a lower cost of living and potentially poorer labor market conditions. Under this scenario, our estimates of φ will combine the effect of local 21 Wooldridge (2010) and indicate that individual unobserved heterogeneity may be less of a concern in models that control flexibly for duration dependence. Although we do not control in a completely flexible manner for duration dependence (i.e., a monthly step function in spell length), our cubic function in spell length does avoid strong parametric assumptions). 22 Other functional forms for η are also possible. Common choices include gamma distribution or a more flexible discrete mass point distribution. We attempted to estimate models with alternate functional forms of η, however, these models would not converge. 23 This may be a particular concern since we are not able to control for typical measures of individual skill such educational attainment. labor market conditions with the effect of endogenous relocation decisions.
To rule out the possibility that our main results in Table 2 are driven by this type of endogenous mobility, we estimate equation 3 over the subsample of individuals who are never observed to change counties. Column 2 of Table 3 shows the results of this exercise.
The point estimates on the log employment variables are remarkably similar to those in Table 2 . As in column 1, the magnitude of the coefficients on food service and retail employment increase slightly and become more precise. In general, these results suggest endogenous mobility is not a factor that drives our main findings.
New York City
New York City comprised over 42 percent of the state population in 2010. 24 Indeed, Table 1 showed that 76 percent of our sample lived in a county that is part of a metropolitan area.
To verify that our main results hold for residents of counties that are not part of New York City, we obtain estimates that exclude residents of Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, and Richmond Counties from the sample. Column 3 of Table 3 shows the results of this exercise.
Despite the reduction in observations (person-months) from just over 431,700 in Table 2 to just over 191,760, our main findings do not change appreciably when analysis is restricted to counties outside of New York City. In fact, the point estimate on construction is essentially unchanged, and the point estimate on food service is larger and more precise when New York City residents are excluded from the sample. The point estimate on retail employment is somewhat smaller in magnitude and less precise, at the five percent significance level. We conclude that our main results in Table 2 hold throughout the state, and are not specific to the particular economic climate in New York City.
Cohort Effects
Individuals who enrolled in SNAP prior to the Great Recession likely differed on average from those who entered the program during or even after the recession. 25 The Great Recession brought many first-time recipients into the program who had stronger attachment to the labor force than the typical pre-recession recipient . Indeed, Appendix Table A2 shows a compositional shift over our observation period toward a greater share of urban-dwelling non-Hispanic white males with more stable residential histories. To address potential compositional differences between the pre-recession entry cohort and other entry cohorts we add an indicator for appearing in the data after the beginning of the recession and interact that indicator with the log employment measures for each of the industries. Column 4 of Table 3 shows the main estimated effects on the log employment measures; allowing log employment effects to vary by the pre-and post-recession entry cohorts has little impact on our point estimates interms of magnitude or precision. We conclude that, despite the measureable differences in the types of people whose first observable SNAP spells began after the onset of the Great Recession, the estimated relationship between localized employment growth in relevant industries and SNAP exit is not influenced by Recession-induced changes to the SNAP caseload composition. 24 Author's calculation based on the Census 2010 Demographic Profile. 25 At least on the national level, the job market was slow to recover even after the official end of the recession.
Lagged labor market effects
As another sensitivity check, we re-estimate the full model in Table 2 but also include additional controls for one-period lagged measures of log employment for each of the industries. This is meant to address concerns over the potential endogeneity of the labor market variables as well as the timing of individuals' behavioral response to changes in local labor market conditions. It is possible, for example, that changes in the aggregate rate of exit from SNAP in a given month might well have an independent effect on county-level employment and wages in common destination industries for SNAP leavers. If there is substantial feedback from SNAP exit rates in a given month to employment in these industries, we would expect that the models in Table 2 would overstate the (positive) effect of industry-specific employment on the hazard of SNAP exit. Moreover, it may be that, for administrative and other reasons, labor demand conditions operate with a lag on the decision of individuals to exit SNAP, so that the behavioral response of SNAP recipients is better captured by a one-period lag of local labor market variables.
Including one-period lagged measures along with the contemporaneous labor market measures produces results broadly similar to our primary specification, and very much in line with the results of other specification checks in columns 1-3. The coefficients on construction and retail are attenuated relative to our main results, but the estimated effects of employment growth in food services and retail services remain relatively large and statistically significant.
Second spells
As we noted in Section 3, roughly 30 percent of adult recipients in New York experienced more than one SNAP spell between 2007 and 2012, even when smoothing over one-month gaps in participation. The models in Table 2 , however, were estimated only for first spells observed during the sample period. Ignoring higher order spells may introduce bias to our estimates. To address this, we estimate separate models for each spell number, allowing all covariates in the model to vary by spell number and show results for second spells in column 6. Unsurprisingly, some precision is lost when estimating the model on the smaller sample. However, the point estimates remain remarkably stable, especially considering that this population of SNAP "recidivists" is likely to be quite different from population included in the analysis of first spells only.
"Placebo" Test
Lastly, we examine the possibility that employment trends in the industries we have selected are simply following overall county trends that could be captured just as well by other industries that are not major employers of SNAP recipients. We therefore run a "placebo test" in which we substitute the previous set of industries that have high shares of SNAP participants with three industries that have relatively low shares of SNAP recipients. These industries are finance, information, and utilities. Results, appearing in column 7 of Table 3 , show small and statistically insignificant estimates for each of the industries considered. This suggests employment trends in at least some of the important destination industries for SNAP recipients are capturing variation that is different from industries that employ relatively few SNAP recipients.
Extensions
Race and Hispanic origin
Next, we interact race and Hispanic origin indicators with each of the county-and industryspecific measures of employment and wages in order to examine how the main results in Table 2 differ across demographic groups. The omitted category is non-Hispanic White alone, and we obtain estimates for non-Hispanic Black or African American alone, Hispanic, and all other non-Hispanic races. Results appear in Table 4 . In general, we find that labor market effects on SNAP exit vary substantially across race and ethnic groups. Table 4 shows that the estimated effects in Table 2 are largely driven by non-Hispanic White alone participants' responsiveness to their local labor market conditions. For example, we saw in Table 2 column 4 that a one percent increase in food service employment is associated with a 52 percent overall conditional increase in the likelihood of exiting SNAP.
In Table 4 column 2, the main industry effect is 1.54 (significant at the 1 percent error level), implying non-Hispanic White alone participants (the omitted category) experience a 54 percent increase in exit hazard for a 1 percent increase in food service employment.
Conversely, SNAP participants who identify as Hispanic become about 5 percent less likely to exit the program as local food service employment levels increase (significant at the 0.01 percent level). Non-Hispanic Black alone participants exhibit no statistical relationship between local food service employment levels and the hazard of exiting the program. The estimated effects of growth in local retail employment on SNAP exit in column 4 follow a similar pattern of being positive and large for non-Hispanic White alone participants and negative (albeit relatively small in magnitude) for Hispanic participants.
Gender and the Presence of Children
It is well-established that labor market experiences and patterns of anti-poverty program participation differ along dimensions of gender and parenthood. In Table 5 , we examine whether estimated industry employment effects vary by the gender of the SNAP recipient and by the presence of children in the SNAP unit. The positive and significant coefficients (save for manufacturing) on the main industry effects in columns 1-4 show that SNAP exit is more sensitive to local labor market fluctuations among males without children (the omitted category) than males with children as well as females with children. For example, females with children experience a 6 percent decrease in exit hazard (significant at the 5 percent level) when employment grows in their local food service industry.
SNAP Entries
Our focus thus far has been exclusively on the likelihood that existing SNAP recipients leave the program. It is important to verify that fluctuations in entry rates are also consistent with our findings that SNAP participants are sensitive to highly localized and industry-specific fluctations in their labor markets. Our approach is straightforward. We estimate OLS regressions of county log entry rates for a given month, in total and by demographic group, as a function log industry employment. We control for log population, log labor force, year effects, county effects, and county time trends. Standard errors are cluster at the county-level.
The results appear in Table 6 and suggest that food service employment, in particular, is associated with a decline in SNAP entries for the sample as a whole as well as for the female and non-Hispanic White alone subsamples. The non-Hispanic Black alone and Hispanic subsamples also exhibited negative coefficients but these were smaller and insignificant. An increase in retail employment is also associated with a significant decrease in SNAP entries for the sample as a whole and for the non-Hispanic White alone subpopulation. We conclude that the patterns of entry rates are broadly consistent with our findings on exits.
Conclusion
This study offers an investigation of an issue of central importance for SNAP policy and administration: how do labor market conditions affect the probability that recipients leave the program? The key contribution has been to focus on more granular measures of local labor market conditions than has previously been done in studies of SNAP dynamics, looking at both the county and the industry level. We find that, even when including county fixed effects and county time trends, increases in employment in certain industries important to SNAP recipients significantly increase the probability that SNAP recipients exit the program. In particular, the food service and retail industries showed robust, positive effects on the exit hazard for SNAP recipients. Manufacturing and, in some specifications, construction had more modest positive effects on the likelihood of exit.
Our main findings are conditional on several person, case unit, and local area controls, and they are robust to a series of sensitivity analyses. Although our main analysis is based on first spells and contemporaneous measures of county-level industry-specific labor market variables, we find that the results hold when looking at second spells and when using lagged measures of the local labor market variables. We also rule out the possibility that our estimates are driven by endogenous mobility or unobserved characteristics specific to the residents and labor markets of New York City. Finally, we leverage the demographic information afforded by linking the administrative data to the 2010 Census to show that employment and wage fluctuations in participants' local industries have differential effects across demographic groups. Non-Hispanic White alone participants, especially, benefited from employment growth across the local industries highlighted in this study. Growth in retail employment, however, significantly increased program exit probabilities for Hispanics and non-Hispanic Black alone participants.
Our findings point to the important role of local and industry-specific labor demand factors on the duration of SNAP participation. It is notable that we found strong effects for these variables without controlling for many of those individual, or household, characteristics, such as health issues and disability, that would likely signal a need for long-term SNAP receipt irrespective of local labor demand. Looking too broadly at labor demand-at the national or even state level-may provide a misleading picture about the strength of the link between labor demand and SNAP, especially in time of uneven economic recovery. Policies that ignore this local link and seek to reduce the regulatory flexibility currently given to states to extend eligibility in areas where labor markets are slower to recover (or faster to decline) may have undesirable consequences. 1.12 * * * 1.12 * * * 1.12 * * * 1.12 * * * 1.12 * * * (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) t squared 0.99 * * * 0.99 * * * 0.99 * * * 0.99 * * * 0.99 * * * (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) t cubed 1.00 * * * 1.00 * * * 1.00 * * * 1.00 * * * 1.00 * * * (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
A Additional Tables
